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Abstract. In this article I will claim that from a Thomist perspective the question “Soul 
or Brain: What makes us human?” presents us with a false dilemma and hence must as 
such remain an unanswerable question. In order to corroborate this claim I will do two 
things. First, I present the framework of a Thomistic anthropology in so far as it relates 
to the unity of soul and body in the human person. Next, I deal with the question that 
immediately results from this unity, i.e. the subsistence of the soul. From a Thomist 
perspective this question can be answered apart from any findings from neuroscience.
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Introduction
If we take the question “Soul or Brain: What makes us human?”1 at face 
value, we are presented with a dilemma which forces us to take a position in 
which either the soul or the brain is that which defines our human nature. 
1 This contribution has as its origin an intervention during an interdisciplinary workshop 
entitled “Soul or Brain: What makes us human?” at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in 
Torun, Poland on 19-21 October 2016. Both the intervention as well as this contribution 
intends to offer a Thomistic framework to the debate. For a much more detailed account 
of Aquinas’ position in dialogue with the different currents within the philosophy of mind 
I refer for instance to Kläden (2005).
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In this article I will argue that the formulation of the question from a Thomist 
perspective presents us with a false dilemma because the question already 
contains in itself the presumed answer and implicitly reveals a dualistic 
mindset. From a Thomist perspective, however, any identification of the 
human being with either the soul or the brain runs counter to the unity 
of soul and body in the human being. After briefly outlining the historical 
background of Aquinas’ position, I will explore in part 1 the body-soul 
unity more in depth from the perspective of the body (brain) and of the 
soul. In part 2, I will address the question that immediately results from 
the body-soul unity, i.e. the subsistence of the human soul. This question, 
I will argue, can be answered within a Thomist perspective apart from any 
findings in neuroscience.
One of the distinguishing features of the Thomist tradition, both 
historically and systematically, is the defense of the unity of soul and body 
in man (Elders 1997), a defense which is directed against the identification 
of man with his soul. For Thomas Aquinas this defense was necessary in 
light of the Platonic tradition of some Church Fathers, and in particular 
the early Augustine (Augustine 1986, 158; 1955, 776), for whom the soul 
was considered to be a complete substance which made use of the body as 
an instrument at best or was burdened by the body at worst (Bochet 2016).
The rediscovery of Aristotle’s writings and in particular the introduction 
of the De anima in the Latin West (De Boer 2013) at first did not contribute 
to overcoming this Platonic dualism. For Aquinas’s immediate predecessors 
and contemporaries, soul and body remain in some way two substances 
(Wéber 1991; Hasse 2000, 80–91; Bieniak 2013, 9–46; Blankenhorn 2015, 
215–248). Even Aquinas’s own teacher, Albert the Great, defends an eclectic 
position (Bazan 1997), distinguishing between two different (Platonic vs 
Aristotelian) spheres of inquiry. He writes: “If we consider the soul in itself 
(secundum se), then we agree with Plato; but if we consider it according to 
the form which it gives to the body and animates it, then we agree with 
Aristotle.” (Albertus 1895, 16b) 
If one were to say that the individual man is identical to his soul then 
this would have far reaching consequences regarding the question ‘which 
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is the subject to whom the actions of this individual man should be attrib-
uted’. For if the individual man is identical to his soul, only the soul can 
be regarded as being the true subject of that man’s actions. This radically 
Platonic position would entail that even the acts of sensation have as their 
subject the soul, a view which Thomas rejects as contrary to common sense 
experience, by which we realize that it is the soul body unity which performs 
acts of sensation (ST I, 74, 4c).
This radically Platonic position would also entail that the subject of 
the intellectual acts of an individual man is radically different from the 
subject of the acts of sensation. Again, Thomas views this position, which 
holds that an individual man contains within himself two radically different 
subjects, as contrary to common sense experience for it would follow that 
an individual man “is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being 
absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one” (ST I, 76, 1c).
Given this common sense experience, Thomas is able to adopt a hy-
lomorphic account of the body-soul unity. In such an account the form of 
a thing is that whereby the thing primarily acts (ST I, 76, 1c) and the form 
of man is that whereby a man acts in a specifically human manner, i.e. 
through intellectual knowledge. Hence, the intellectual soul must be the 
form of the body.
The other extreme would be to say that an individual man is identical to 
the body, understood as a mere collection of mechanically operating parts. 
The reason why Thomas has devoted no attention to this other extreme 
is fairly apparent. This – merely speculative – position would implicitly 
equate the human body with formless matter, which is mere potency and 
of which it is impossible to predicate existence properly. Matter, therefore, 
cannot have an entitative act but receives this act from the matter-form 
unity of a substance. A living human body therefore is always informed by 
the soul and the human body cannot exist in its own right apart from the 
soul. It is therefore telling that the expression “I am my body”, as formulated 
by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception (2002, 296) and by 
Gabriel Marcel in his The Mystery of Being (2001, 100) is sharply directed 
against Cartesian dualism. 
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With this brief outline in place, I will in part 1 analyze the consequences 
of this body-soul unity from the perspectives of the brain, which one can 
regard as a totum pro parte of the body, and from the perspective of the 
soul. In using the term ‘perspective’, I want to emphasize that within the 
integrated Thomistic account of the human being, body and soul are distinct 
and real but not as an unqualified this, they “are not two kinds of thing 
needing to be unified by yet a third kind” (Brock 2015, 48–49) but rather 
perspectives on the whole of the substantial unity. 
1. The soul body unity
1.1. From the perspective of the body (brain)
From his earliest writings onward, Thomas defended the twofold claim that 
first, sensory images are the source from which the content of intellectual 
knowledge is abstracted and second, that these sensory images are that to 
which the intellect must turn back in order to actually know something 
(conversio ad phantasmata) (In II Sent., 20, 2, 2, ad 3; ScG II, 73; ST I, 87, 8). 
Consequently, every intellectual act involves to some extent the bodily 
organism and its organs or – more particularly – the brain and as such every 
intellectual act is somehow measurable.
Thomas recognizes very clearly that not only the external senses but also 
the internal senses have as a necessary condition the properly functioning 
activities of the body and in particular the brain. The internal senses, i.e. 
the common sense (ST I, 78, 4, ad 2; In De Anima III, l. 3, nrs. 599–600), 
imagination (ST I, 78, 4; In De Anima III, lect. 6, nrs. 664–665), sensitive 
memory (ST I, 78, 4) and estimative sense (cogitative sense in humans) 
(ST I, 78, 4; In De Anima III, lect 6, nr. 398) are not those senses which are 
in contact with the things they perceive as is the case with the external 
senses, but are those senses which account for the preservation of what has 
been perceived and the recognition and provision of instinctive knowledge. 
The involvement of the bodily organism and the brain in the acquisition 
of knowledge can be illustrated by the following four examples. Firstly, 
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the necessary dependence of the internal senses mentioned above on the 
brain as its organ according to Thomas is illustrated by the following texts. 
Thomas writes, “man, in proportion to his size, has a larger brain than any 
other animal, because a good disposition of the brain is necessary for the 
good condition of the internal sentient powers, namely, the imagination, 
the memory, and the cogitative power.” (Q.D. De Anima, q. un., a. 8 c).   
Elsewhere, he writes as follows: “man needs the largest brain as compared 
to the body for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required 
for the intellectual operations” (ST I, 91, 3, ad 1). 
Secondly, and influenced by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics VII, 6, 
1149a24), Thomas equally recognizes the influence of what he calls “natural 
temperament” (complexio naturalis) on the formation of virtues and vices, for 
instance when, in distinguishing between a “bodily” and a “spiritual” cause 
of concupiscence he writes: “some people by their natural temperament are 
more prone to concupiscence than others” (ST II–II, 155, 4, ad 2). One could 
identify this natural temperament with what today is called neurological or 
genetic predispositions which can vary from person to person. These bodily 
causes remain merely occasional causes rather than direct causes because 
Aquinas is convinced that man, “as long as the use of reason remains” 
(ST II–II, 4; also In II Sent., d. 25, 1, 1, ad 5), can resist these bodily causes. 
Thirdly, he also recognizes that the intellect, because its proper and 
proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing, can be hindered by 
suspension of the external and internal senses (ST I, 84, 8). This occurs for 
instance in the case of persons in a frenzy or in a lethargic state in which 
cases the acts of imagination (frenzy) and memory (lethargy) are hindered 
(ST I, 87, 4; ScG III, 84). But not even self-knowledge is merely an act of the 
intellect because, as Thomas says, “if certain corporeal organs have been 
harmed, the soul cannot directly understand either itself or anything else, 
as when the brain is injured.” (De Spir. Creat., q. un., 2, ad 7).
Fourthly and finally, Thomas is also aware, despite his outdated ex-
planations, of the interdependency of soul and body in causing certain 
psychosomatic illnesses (aegritutodo animalis) such as various anxiety dis-
orders (In VII Ethic., l. 5, n. 1380), eating disorders (In III Ethic., l. 20, n. 623; 
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ST II–II, 148, 6, ad 2) and sexual and other perversions such as sadism, etc. 
(ST II–II, 157, 1 ad 3). In fact, Thomas would oppose the notion of ‘mental 
illness’ because the mind as such cannot be ill but merely err (intellect) or be 
evil (will). A so-called ‘mental’ illness has a bodily cause which subsequently 
can manifest itself in a pathological form of the intellect’s or the will’s acts 
(In I De Anima, l. 10, nrs. 163–164).
Much more could be said about these and other examples (Echavarría 
2009, 375–562) but what they show is that for Thomas the body and the brain 
(taken as totum pro parte) act as a material, dispositive and instrumental 
cause, i.e. the body and the brain offer as an instrumental agent cause the 
material and the disposition for the production of the ultimate effect by 
another agent cause, the intellect. This type of causality should not be 
misunderstood: any parallelism or even conditional relation between soul 
and body (brain) does not in itself constitute an argument for emergence 
Moreover, this purely observable type of causality has its intrinsic limits 
due to the methodology employed by modern science. Modern science is 
by definition operative on the level of what is quantitatively measurable 
and as such studies merely the quantitative aspect of things whereas the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of nature “is concerned with the entire 
reality” (Elders 1997, 26). As Robert Augros observed: “A scientist has neither 
any reason nor any need to deny that there might be ways of understanding 
nature besides the way of measurement.” (Augros 2004, 131).
The differentiated unity of soul and body defended by Aquinas implies 
the view that the body contributes in a positive manner to the soul and its 
operations. Aquinas views this contribution of the body as crucial to such 
an extent that he can affirm that the intellectual soul is united to the body 
for the sake of the soul. In so far as the body is necessary for the intellectual 
soul and in so far as the unity of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul, 
the body is always ‘charged’ with meaning and never exists as a “morally 
neutral playground” (Gondreau 2008, 749). As such there exists for Thomas 
a qualitative difference between the human body (united to an intellectual 
soul) and the body of an animal, a difference which Thomas expresses as 
follows: “the body is a certain fullness of the soul (quadam plenitudo animae)” 
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(In Ephesians 1:23, nr. 71). Marie-Joseph Nicolas comments by writing that 
the human body is “le champ expressif de l’âme” or “la face extérieure de 
lame” (Nicholas 1979, quoted in Emery 2000, 225).
1.2. From the perspective of the soul
Aquinas’s position that the soul is the one and only substantial form of 
the body is at odds with a Cartesian view of the soul as an immaterial part 
of the human being. Aquinas’s position entails that, although the soul 
is not identical with the body, the soul belongs to the nature of a bodily 
substance. It does so because the soul is the principle of the unity of the 
body and as such the soul constitutes the body. In other words, the soul 
does not have a species of its own, otherwise it would be an angel (ST I, 
90, 4, ad 2); it is not a complete, fully distinct entity but part of a complete 
entity, a human being. Aquinas, moreover, qualifies our way of speaking 
regarding the human being in terms of parts or components. Following 
Aristotle, he distinguishes between a logical and a metaphysical approach 
(In Meta. VII, l. 13, nr. 1576). The elements of a definition do not necessarily 
correspond to components or parts of the thing defined by the definition. 
Hence, our way of speaking in terms of parts or components does not entail 
that a human being consists of two previously separated parts, now joined 
together. Rather, his position on the unity of the substantial form entails 
that the form, i.e. the soul, is constitutive of something that is both rational 
and bodily. Stephen Brock expresses Aquinas’s position as follows: “Man’s 
formal principle is something spiritual; but it is nevertheless a principle of 
something physical and essentially so. Its nature is proportioned to that of 
which it is the principle. Even if it is “on the border” [referring to ST I, 77, 2] 
of spiritual and bodily creatures, its natural home is clearly in the physical 
world.” (Brock 2005, 234).
In this view, the soul by itself is not a complete subject, it does not 
exhaust the totality of what it means to be a human person. Hence, the soul 
cannot be viewed as identical to the modern Cartesian-like ‘self’, which would 
somehow and somewhere be present in the body. As the unique substantial 
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form of the body, the soul is everywhere and nowhere. Not only is the soul 
not part of the body, metaphysically speaking, but neither is the soul a part 
of the body, locatable as it were in some place. Concretely this view entails 
that the human being, as a rational animal, is not characterized by ‘pure 
thinking’ but by ‘sensing thinking’. In the words of Aquinas: “it is the very 
man himself who perceives himself both to understand and to sense; but 
sensing is not without the body, and so the body must be some part of the 
man” (ST I, 76, a). 
I therefore think that the debate between survivalists and corruptionists 
largely rests on a truncated account of the soul-body unity, as understood 
by Aquinas. By means of his account, Aquinas is able to affirm both, i.e. 
the human being continues to exist in some way (survivalism), but the 
human being, for whom the body is integral to his nature, also ceases to 
exist after death (corruptionism). In other words, the state of existence of 
the separated soul is both a state of existence as well as a state of severely 
diminished existence. Because of the separation of body and soul from the 
body-soul unity of substance, the separated soul is no longer an individual 
substance and hence it is no longer possible to apply a definition or a name 
to such a separated soul (ST I, 29, 1, ad 5). The fact that a separated soul is no 
longer an individual substance does not, however, entail the disappearance 
of the soul of the human being, to which it belonged before death; rather 
it subsists as soul of that human being. Put briefly, John continues to exist 
after death as the soul of John (survivalism) but not as John (corruptionism) 
but in a state, deprived of “the perfection of its [the soul’s] nature” (ST I, 
118, 3). Thomas is entirely consistent when, regarding a theological matter 
that was widely disputed in his time (Wéber 1991), he holds on to the view 
that Christ was no longer a man during the days of the Triduum of his 
death. For if Christ were still a man during the days of the Triduum of his 
death, that would for him entail the heretical (“contra fidem” ST III, 50, 
4) view that Christ was not truly dead and hence that mankind would not 
be truly saved. The fact that Aquinas holds on to his largely Aristotelian 
anthropology is a testimony to his guiding principle that grace does not 
destroy, but perfects nature.
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2. The role of the arguments for the subsistence  
of the human soul
If actuality is constitutive of the form and if the soul is the form of the body, 
no matter, being anything merely potential, can enter in the composition 
of the soul itself (ST I, 75, 5). However, if the soul-body unity is as tight 
as described in part 1, it seems that both cannot exist without each other. 
In fact, Thomas admits as much when he writes: “It is also clear from what 
was said in Book II that the soul is naturally united to the body, for in its 
essence it is the form of the body. It, then, is contrary to the nature of the 
soul to be without the body” (ScG IV, 79). The soul-body unity requires 
therefore an investigation into the possibility of the subsistence of the 
soul after death, i.e. the fact that the soul possesses in itself something by 
which it remains in being. From a Thomist perspective this question can 
be answered apart from any findings from neuroscience. In what follows 
I will present three arguments in favor of the subsistence of the human soul 
which can be found explicitly or implicitly in Aquinas’ writings and provide 
analogies which illustrate his reasoning.2
The argument from the uniqueness of intellectual knowledge is Aquinas’s 
preferred argument. Sensorial knowledge always requires a material organ. 
These sensorial processes (for instance from the eyes, along the optic nerve, 
to the brain) are well documented and can be described by neuroscience. The 
objects of these sensorial processes are always concrete, particular objects. 
The object of intellectual knowledge, however, is not an individual object but 
an abstract object, that is, something which is the result of abstraction and it 
is grasped by the intellect according to the ratio of what is common to all par-
ticular objects. On the basis of this difference between absolute and particular 
objects, one can construct the following argument for the immateriality of 
the intellect. Every material organ grasps a particular whereas the intellect 
grasps the abstract or universal. The abstract or the universal are therefore 
not grasped by a material organ. The intellect’s activity therefore, although 
made possible by bodily organs, does not consist in the activity of a bodily, 
2 For the textual evidence, see ST I, 75, 5; De Ver. 10, 8; ScG II, 79 and Oguejiofor (2001). 
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material organ. For Thomas, a denial of the immateriality of the intellect would 
make an answer to the following question impossible: How could something 
that is not individual be grasped by something that is individual, given that 
a material organ is by nature limited and limiting, able to facilitate knowledge 
only of certain things or of certain aspects of a thing (the eye sees color, 
touch manifests the texture of a body, etc.)? The object of knowledge must 
be proportioned to the intellect. Only an intellect that is not material itself 
can grasp something non-material such as a universal. If intellectual activity 
proceeds through universal concepts and applies to being as such universally, 
a wholly physicalist account of intellectual knowledge becomes a contradictio 
in terminis because it reduces what is universal to what is material and hence 
particular. The following analogy can be useful. Following a reductionist 
account of intellectual knowledge, one would have to say that to every 
universal concept corresponds a match we place in a matchbox every time 
there occurs an intellectual activity. There could, however, never be enough 
matches in the matchbox if it is possible that there exist non-particular, 
universal concepts. In short, there is no proportion between a limited set of 
matches and the formulation of unlimited, universal concepts.
Moreover and more fundamentally, in a reductionist account the 
adaequatio of intellect to reality becomes impossible. The metaphysical 
principle that being is not non-being and its subsequent logical expression 
in the principle of non-contradiction provides the basis for objectivity. In 
a reductionist account the intellect’s capacity to form universal concepts 
and hence the capacity to conform to a state of affairs is being reduced to 
or identified with a set of particulars such as brain functions. In such an 
account the adaequatio of intellect to reality becomes impossible because 
the intellect would only have contact with particular brain states and would 
not possess the capacity to judge these brain states as to their adequacy 
regarding anything beyond theses brain states.3
A second argument is the argument from self-reflection and self-expe-
rience. If one grants the existence of lived and inner acts of self-reflection 
3 Hence the principle that “intellectual knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality” in ST I, 
84, 2.
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and self-experience and if one grants the necessity of the presence of 
a conscious and indivisible subject from which these inner acts proceed, 
then a material and composite entity such as brain cannot be a sufficient 
condition for these inner acts. Thomas writes: “the action of no body is 
self-reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself 
except with respect to a part, so that one part of it is the mover and the 
other the moved. But in acting the intellect reflects on itself, not only as to 
a part, but as to the whole of itself. Therefore, it is not a body” (ScG II, 49). 
The following analogy might be helpful. Suppose I am listening to a Mahler 
symphony. Both the external process of the activity of listening as well as 
its corresponding brain activities can be registered. Given that the process 
of listening cannot exist without temporarily and spatially extended parts 
and phases, it is evident that the process requires a material entity as 
bearer. The registration and corresponding description of the external 
process, however, does not account for the self-reflective experience of 
the subject who does the listening. In other words, the aesthetic reality of 
the experience by a self-reflective subject, although requiring a material 
bearer, is not exhausted by the external registration and description of the 
corresponding brain processes, and even more, the aesthetic reality cannot 
be realized by a subject who possesses the same material features as the 
musical score and its audible performance.
A third argument proceeds from the experience of free acts and argues 
that the experience and existence of such free acts is both unintelligible and 
metaphysically impossible if these acts are merely identical with or fully 
determined by material processes such as these of the brain. An excellent 
illustration of this argument, albeit in the form of a reduction ad absurdum, 
is offered by Hans Jonas in the following story (Jonas 1981, 13). The German 
scientist Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz (1821–1894) and his 
friends vowed that they would only admit a strictly materialistic explanation 
of the human person. However, as Jonas remarks, an analysis of such a vow 
shows that such a vow only makes sense, that is, such a vow can only be 
meaningfully uttered on the assumption that the vow could and would be kept. 
Such an assumption, however, presupposes that the act of vowing is causally 
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independent from brain processes, a presupposition which at the same time 
is being denied by their own reductionist materialism. In other words, in the 
very moment of making that vow von Helmholtz and his friends contradict 
their own theory of materialism. This story could be extended to every free act 
because by definition a free act does not proceed from any other cause than the 
human person4 and as such free acts cannot exist in a materialistic account.5 
These and other arguments are the Thomistic basis for the conclusion 
that the human soul is a subsistent principle, sc. it executes its operation 
of knowing and willing by itself and therefore exists or subsists also by 
itself and hence has no principle of corruption within itself. An important 
remark is in order at this point. The subsistence of the soul is often viewed 
as a return of substantial dualism. Regarding the conditions for existing 
as an individual substance, Thomas, however, writes: “an individual in the 
genus of substance is capable not only of subsisting of itself, but is also 
a complete entity belonging to a definite species and genus of substance” 
(De Anima, q. un., a. 1 c). Gilles Emery has pointed out, therefore, that there 
are two ontological conditions that need to be met in order to have a full-
fledged substance dualism. A substance “needs to subsist by itself” and “it 
needs to be complete in its own species, that is, to possess everything that 
is required by the nature of such a thing.” The soul is a reality complete in 
itself, but it does not constitute the whole essence of man. Hence, while 
the soul does possess an “independence of existence” with regard to matter 
and thus fulfills the first condition, it does not fulfill the second condition 
because it does not possess an “independence of essence” (Emery 2007, 222).
Conclusion
The question in the introduction (“Soul or brain: what makes us human?”) 
is from a Thomist perspective an unanswerable question because the 
4 At least at the level of horizontal causality and not taking into account the vertical 
causality (praemotio physica) of God.
5 For a more comprehensive textual basis in Aquinas of arguments 2 and 3 see Scarpelly 
Cory (2016).
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questions presents us with a situation without choice. Why is this? Soul 
or brain are not and cannot be for Aquinas separate alternatives. Neither 
the soul nor the body or the brain as part of the body is a complete, fully 
distinct entity but are metaphysical parts of a complete entity, a human 
being. Thomistic hylomorphism entails the idea that the actuality of the 
body (matter) is derivative of the soul (form), which is the principle of vital 
activity and substantial unity. The soul-body unity runs counter to the idea 
of a predetermined body and a predetermined soul, coming together to form 
a merely accidental union. In a Thomistic hylomorphism, on the contrary, 
one can easily admit, as Aquinas does, the real influence of the brain on 
the activities of the soul.
Presenting the soul or the brain as alternative defining characteristics 
of man, assumes an entirely different anthropology, a typically Cartesian 
anthropology which considers the body and the soul as two substances, 
each with its own essential attribute, consciousness and extension. In such 
an anthropology and given the advances in neuroscience there can occur 
the risk of looking for a ‘soul of the gaps’. From a Thomistic perspective, 
however, the soul is not a neuroscientific concept but a metaphysical and 
anthropological reality which, as such, is able to subsist as our experiences 
of intellectual, personal and moral knowledge show.
Let me close these observations by offering a Catholic disclaimer. From 
the perspective of Catholic philosophy and theology, it is also crucial to recall 
what Hans Urs von Balthasar has called the ‘form of thought’ or Denkform 
of Catholic thought (Balthasar 1951), a notion coined in his discussion with 
Karl Barth and taken up extensively by Leo Scheffczyk. According to Leo 
Scheffczyk, a ‘form of thought’ is a formal principle which gives a structure to 
all the conceptual content (Scheffczyk 2008, 34–45). Such a form of thought 
is not so much a matter of logic, although it is certainly influenced by 
a specific view of the world, but is much more connected to one’s experience 
and tradition through which reality enters into the mind. Now, the Catholic 
form of thought is, as Barth himself admits, always a “Theologie des ‘und’” 
(Barth 1948, 619), a form of thought in which two seemingly contrary aspects 
are being kept together in a unity-in-distinctness, a complementary of the 
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relation of, say, nature and grace, Scripture and Tradition, faith and merit, 
the individual and the community, theology and philosophy, such that it 
is erroneous to ignore both their distinction as well as their union (Royal 
2016, 152–164). One could easily add to this list the unity-in-distinctness 
of soul and body (brain).
Abbreviations
For the works of Thomas Aquinas I have used the well-known abbreviations 
and divisions: ST (Summa Theologiae), ScG (Summa contra Gentiles), In Meta. 
(Sententia libri Metaphysicae), In Ethic. (Sententia libri Ethicorum), In Sent. 
(Scriptum super Sententiis), etc. All English translations are taken from: 
http://dhspriory.org/thomas.
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